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I
INTRODUCTION

Since 1961, both the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "the
Commission") and the courts in the United States have been struggling in
their attempts to define precisely what conduct constitutes improper trading
on nonpublic information.'
As of 1992, neither Congress nor the
Commission have been willing to take the bull by the horns and promulgate a
definition. In contrast, in its Insider Trading Directive, the European
Community ("EC") has made such a bold move. 2 Much of the Directive is
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1. SEC Rule 1Ob-5 was first used to combat insider trading in In the Matter of Cady Roberts, 40
SEC 907 (1961), where the Commission issued sanctions against a registered broker-dealer who,
while in possession of information concerning a planned dividend cut, directed his customers to
liquidate their holdings. The Commission held that this conduct "violated [Rule lOb-5(3)] as a
practice which operated . . . as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers." Id at 913. The Commission
continued:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose the information or abstain from trading] rests on
two principle elements: first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.
Id at 912.
2. Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, Directive 89/592, art 32
1989 OJ (L 334) 30, 1 Common Mkt Rep (CCH)
1761 ("EC Insider Trading Directive"). See
generally Marjory Appel & Gerhard Wegen, The EEC Directive on Insider Trading, 22 Rev SEC &
Commodities Reg 137 (1989); Christopher Cruickshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 Intl Bus L 345
(1982); Raffaello Fornasier, The Directive on Insider Dealing, 13 Fordham Intl L J 149 (1989-90); Klaus
Hopt, The European Insider Dealing Directive, 27 Common Mkt L Rev 51 (1990); Manning G. Warren,
The Regulation of Insider Trading in the European Community, 48 Wash & Lee L Rev 1037 (1991); Manning
G. Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 Harv
Intl LJ 185 (1990); Comment, Insider Trading and the EC: Harmonizationof the Insider Trading Laws of the
Member States, 8 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 151 (1985) (authored by Lisa Hedges); Note, Toward the
Unificationof European CapitalMarkets: The EEC's ProposedDirective on Insider Trading, 11 Fordham Intl L
J 432 (1988) (authored by Christine McGuinness); Note, Securities-Insider Trading-The Effects of the
New EEC Draft Insider Trading Directive, 18 Ga J Intl & Comp L 119 (1988) (authored by Douglas
Nystrom); Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 Stan L Rev 337 (1989) (authored by Iman
Anabtawi); Note, A ComparativeAnalysis of the European Community Insider Trading Directive, 3 Transnatl L
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premised upon existing insider trading legislation.3 While the EC Directive
borrows from concepts developed by U.S. courts, it provides a needed degree
of certainty that is sorely lacking in U.S. law.
II
U.S. LAw ON INSIDER TRADING

In the United States, liability for trading on the basis of nonpublic
information is premised primarily on an anti-fraud rule, SEC Rule lOb-5.
Since Rule lOb-5 is grounded on fraud, the plaintiff must show that the
information was used or given in violation of a fiduciary or comparable duty. 4
Basing prohibitions against trading on nonpublic information upon a
fiduciary or comparable duty has led to somewhat tortured analyses. For
example, courts have found a Rule lOb-5 obligation based on the doctorpatient relationship 5 and, on appropriate facts, a familial relation231 (1990) (authored by Zachary Winner); Note, A New Look at the European Economic Community
Directive on Insider Trading, 23 Vanderbilt J Transnatl L 135 (1990) (authored by Amy Stutz).
3. The varying approaches to insider trading regulation are discussed in Harvey L. Pitt & David
B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends in the International Response to Insider Trading, 55 Law &
Contemp Probs 199 (Autumn 1992). See generally Barbara Banoff, The Regulation of Insider Trading in
the United States, United Kingdom andJapan, 9 Mich Yearbook Intl Legal Stud 145 (1988); Joseph Blum,
The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of Self-Restraint, 7 Nw J Intl L & Bus 507
(1986); Ronald Bornstein & Elaine Dugger, InternationalRegulation of Insider Trading, 1987 Colum Bus
L Rev 375; Robert Briner, Insider Trading in Switzerland, 10 Intl Bus L 348 (1982); Francois Duhot,
French Regulations on Disclosure Obligations and on Insider Trading, 2 Intl Bus L 96 (1974); Stephen Herne,
Inside Information: Definitions in Australia, Canada, the UK and the US, 8 J Comp Bus & Cap Mkt L 1
(1986); Klaus Hopt, Insider Trading on the Continent, 4 J Comp Corp L & Sec Reg 379 (1982); Mary
Houle, Survey of National Legislation Regulating Insider Trading, 9 Mich Yearbook Intl Legal Stud 209
(1988); Fenwick Huss & Burt Leete, Insider Trading Regulations: A Comparison ofJudicial and Statutory
Sanctions, 25 Am Bus LJ 301 (1987); Hans-Michael Kraus, Securities Regulation in Germany? Investors'
Remedies for Misleading Statements by Issuers, 18 Intl L 109 (1984); James Lightburn, Insider Trading in
France, 7 Intl Fin L Rev 23 (1988); Phillip Pillai, Current Developments in Insider Trading in Singapore and
Malaysia, 16 Malaya L Rev 107 (1974); Edward Rosenbaum, et al, Corporate and Investment Attitudes
Toward Insider Trading in Canada, 8 Can Bus L J 485 (1984); James Sarna, Japan and Insider Trading:
Some Problems When There Are Different Definitions of Right and Wrong, 14 ILSAJ Intl L 67 (1990); Misao
Tatsuta, Enforcement oflapanese Securities Legislation, 1J Comp Corp L & Sec Reg 95, 112 (1978); Andre
Tunc, The Reform of French Insider Trading Law, 4 Company L 205 (1983); Patrick Wallace, Who Is
Subject to the ProhibitionAgainst Insider Trading: A Comparative Study ofAmerican, British and French Law, 15
Sw U L Rev 217 (1985); Larry Zoglin, Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the
JapaneseEquity Market into the Global Securities Market, 1987 Colum Bus L Rev 419; Note, Insider Trading
and the Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 27 Colum J Transnatl L 409 (1989) (authored by
Michael Gerstenzang); Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Hong Kong, 10 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev
647 (1987) (authored by Jonathan Gafni).
4. Chiarella v United States, 445 US 222 (1980). See also, for example, Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v Berner, 472 US 299, 311-12 n21 (1985); Dirks v SEC, 463 US 646, 663 n23 (1983);
United States v Carpenter, 791 F2d 1024, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 US 19 (1987). See
generally Barbara Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and its Aftermath, 49 Ohio St L J 373
(1988).
5. In United States v Willis, 737 F Supp 269 (SD NY 1990), a psychiatrist was indicted under Rule
lOb-5 for allegedly trading on information obtained from a patient in the course of treatment. The
patient was the spouse of a noted corporate executive, who was considering becoming chief
executive officer of Bank America Corp. Armed with this information, the psychiatrist purchased
Bank America stock. The court upheld the indictment since the psychiatrist received the information
while in a position of trust and confidence, and breached that trust when he acted on that
information for his personal benefit. The psychiatrist argued that since he was not directed to keep
the information confidential, he could not be said to have violated any duty. The court rejected that
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ship. 6 Thus, in United States v. Chestman,7 all eleven of the judges seemed to
agree that a family relationship that is intertwined with a business relationship
would be sufficient. Five of the eleven judges found such a confidential
relationship based on marriage alone. Characterizing the husband-wife
relationship as confidential is, of course, a defensible position. However, the
folly of requiring such an antecedent relationship before applying the
"disclose or abstain" rule should be evident. One cannot seriously contend
that Congress enacted the securities laws to protect the sanctity of the
doctor/patient, husband/wife, or father/son relationship or, for that matter,
state law fiduciary duties of officers or managers to stockholders. To premise
an insider trading violation on such a relationship is thus a quirk of U.S. law.
The primary basis of confusion in the United States is the extent to which
Rule lOb-5 applies to persons who are not true insiders. There have been
attempts to apply the rule to those who obtained the information from
someone other than the issuer, and even to apply the rule to remote tippees. 8
However, the cases have failed to provide a reasoned line of decisions. The
confused, and in many instances conflicting, state of the law in the United
States is easily exposed by examination of the facts in a few of the leading
cases.
The Second Circuit has held that a printer of financial documents who
traded on the basis of confidential information belonging to his employer did
so in violation of Rule lOb-5 because he misappropriated the information. 9
Four years earlier, in Chiarella v. United States, 10 the Supreme Court had
opened the door by indicating that although the knowing possession of
information was not sufficient for a Rule 1Ob-5 violation, a showing that the
information was "misappropriated" in breach of a fiduciary duty might be."
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court was split four to four in a case
raising questions as to the vitality of the misappropriation theory of Rule lOb5 liability. 12
argument, reasoning that the information that was passed on to the psychiatrist was confidential by
its very nature, and thus he was not a remote tippee but rather breached a position of trust.
Following the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Chestman, 947 F2d 551 (2d Cir 1991) (en
banc), the court permitted Dr. Willis to withdraw his guilty plea but then once again refused to
dismiss the indictment. United States v Willis, 23 Sec Reg & L Rep (BNA) 1698 (1991). Following that
decision, Dr. Willis reentered his guilty plea. See Psychiatrist Enters Second Guilty Plea to Charges He
Traded on Patient's Data, 24 Sec Reg & L Rep (BNA) 7 (1992).
6. Chestman, 947 F2d 551 (2d Cir 1991) (en banc).
7. Id. See generally Thomas L. Hazen, United States v. Chestman--Trading Securities on the Basis
of Nonpublic Information in Advance of a Tender Offer, 57 Brooklyn L Rev 595 (1991).
8. See, for example, SEC v Switzer, 590 F Supp 756 (WD Okla 1984) (ruling that Rule lOb-5
does not apply to someone overhearing a conversation containing material nonpublic information).
9. SEC v Materia, 745 F2d 197 (2d Cir 1984) (printer violated Rule 1Ob-5 by purchasing a target
company's stock in reliance on nonpublic information obtained from client planning to make a
tender offer).
10. 445 US 222 (1980).
11. Id at 232-35. See id at 238 (Stevens concurring).
12. United States v Carpenter, 791 F2d 1024 (2d Cir 1986), aff'd in part and aff'd in part by an
equally divided Court, 484 US 19 (1987) (conviction of Wall Street Journal reporter and friends for
violations of the securities laws and federal Mail Fraud Act; the securities conviction was affirmed by
an equally divided Court while the mail fraud conviction was unanimously affirmed).
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Dirks v. SEC was another decision in the wake of Chiarella where the
Supreme Court had occasion to further elaborate upon the type of duty that is
necessary to trigger the "disclose or abstain" obligation.' 3 In Dirks, the court
held that a tippee of inside information will not be held accountable unless
the tipper was himself or herself acting in violation of a fiduciary duty. 14 Dirks
involved an enforcement action against an investment advisor who had been
informed by an inside whistleblower that Equity Funding Corporation was
involved in serious accounting fraud (which subsequently led to the
company's insolvency). After trying to alert the regulatory authorities, the
defendant, Dirks, advised his clients to sell Equity Funding stock. The Court
held that, since the information had not been passed on to Dirks for the
purpose of improper insider trading, and since Dirks tried to help uncover the
fraud prior to advising his clients, his passing on the information to his clients
could not properly be said to be in violation of Rule lOb-5.1 5 The Court
explained that "a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders ...

and the tippee

knows or should know that there has been a breach."' 6 Notwithstanding the
confused state of the law in this country, it is clear that a remote tippee will
not be liable under Rule lOb-5,1 7 although in the context of a tender offer,
liability could be premised on Rule 14e-3.
In Chestman,' 8 the defendant, Robert Chestman, a securities broker and
financial advisor, learned from his client Keith Loeb that a tender offer was
about to be made for the stock of Waldbaum, Inc. Loeb's wife was the niece
of Waldbaum's president and controlling shareholder, Ira Waldbaum, who,
along with his immediate family, owned a majority of the outstanding
Waldbaum stock. Loeb was told by his wife, who had been told by her sister,
that Waldbaum was about to be acquired. Loeb claimed he had told
Chestman that he had reliable information that Waldbaum was going to be
taken over and wanted to know what to do. Armed with this information,
Chestman bought the stock for his own account. The district court held that
Chestman knew this was a breach of duty. The divided Second Circuit panel
held that without a showing that Loeb knew there had been a breach of
fiduciary duty, there could be no lOb-5 violation.19 The panel, also by a twoto-one margin, held that Rule 14e-3, which applies on its face, would not be
13. 463 US 646 (1983).
14. Id at 659-61.
15. Id at 661-64.
16. Id at 660.
17. SEC v Switzer, 590 F Supp 756 (WD Okla 1984) (defendant who overheard insiders
discussing nonpublic material information did not violate Rule lOb-5 by trading on the information
since he did not breach any duty).
18. 947 F2d 551.
19. United States v Chestman, 903 F2d 75, 78-80 (2d Cir 1990), rev'd, 947 F2d 555 (2d Cir 1991)
(en banc).
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valid as applied to these facts. 20 As noted above, when the Second Circuit
heard the case en banc, it upheld the Rule 14e-3 conviction by an eleven-toone vote but overturned the Rule lOb-5 conviction by a six-to-five margin.
There have been some modest steps to free the premise of insider trading
regulation from its contemporary dependence upon an antecedent fiduciary
relationship. For example, the SEC's only attempt to define improper trading
is found in Rule 14e-3, which prohibits anyone other than a tender offeror or
its affiliate from purchasing shares while in possession of material nonpublic
information about a yet-to-be announced tender offer. 2 ' Since Rule 14e-3 is
not couched in terms of an antifraud rule, it does not require breach of a duty;
rather, it bases liability upon the possession and use of nonpublic
22
information.
Although provided with ample opportunities, Congress has shied away
from addressing the problem directly. 2 3 In the past, Congress has considered
the imposition of a "possession" test that, as is the case with Rule 14e-3,
would prohibit trading while in possession of material nonpublic
information. 24 Various observers have supported a "use" test which would
have required proof that the trading was in fact based on the information. 2 5
Opposition to a possession test was based in part on the argument that it cast
too wide a net by prohibiting conduct that did not, in fact, involve misuse of
information. The opponents of the proposed "use" test argued that it was
inappropriate to impose liability for trading that was motivated by factors
other than reliance upon the confidential information.
III
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSIDER TRADING DIRECTIVE

The EC Insider Trading Directive stands in stark contrast to the failed

congressional effort to proscribe insider trading. The Directive establishes a
minimum uniform standard for legislation in each of the member states. 26
The directive confronts head-on the problem with which the courts in the
20. Id. Each of the three judges on the panel took a different approach to the Rule 14e-3 claim.
Judge Minor would have sustained the conviction since, although the rule requires more than the
mere possession of information, the prosecution had established more-namely, "that the trader
[knew], or [had] reason to know, that the information was material and nonpublic and derive[d]
directly or indirectly from an insider." 903 F2d at 84. Judge Carman was of the view that Rule 14e-3
can be violated only upon a showing of fraud; accordingly, he voted to reverse the conviction. Id at
87-88 (Carman concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Mahoney, who also voted for
reversal, reasoned that since Rule 14e-3 does not impose a fraud requirement by its terms, the rule is
invalid. Id at 85 (Mahoney concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. 17 CFR §§ 240.14e-3 (1991). This rule was promulgated in an attempt to overturn the
impact of the Chiarella decision.
22. The validity of Rule 14e-3 was upheld by a ten to one decision in United States v Chestman, 947
F2d 555 (2d Cir 1991) (en banc), rev'g 903 F2d 75 (2d Cir 1990).
23. See, for example, Pitt & Hardison, 55 Law & Contemp Probs at 200-01 (cited in note 3).
24. See H Rep No 98-355, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 9, 13-14 (1983), reprinted in 1983 USCCAN
2274, 2282-84 (Insider Trading Sanctions Act legislative history).
25. Id.
26. EC Insider Trading Directive at preamble, art 6 (cited in note 2).
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United States have struggled since 1961-namely, the extent to which the
prohibition extends to persons not in a fiduciary or other special relationship
to the entity whose information is being used. The Directive not only defines
"insider trading," but also categorizes various participants. The Directive sets
forth four basic elements of the type of "inside information" that can form the
basis of illegal trading: (1) the information is nonpublic; (2) the content is of a
precise nature; (3) it relates either to an issuer of publicly traded securities
(fundamental information) or to publicly traded securities (market
information); and (4) if made public, the information would likely have a
27
significant effect on the market price.
The Directive divides persons who possess nonpublic information into two
categories. "Primary" insiders are those persons who have acquired the
information as a result of their employment or other direct positional access
to the source of the information. 28 "Secondary" insiders are those persons
who have obtained the information, but not as a result of such a special
29
relationship, from a source who was, directly or indirectly, a primary insider.
Primary insiders are prohibited from either trading and tipping, whereas
secondary insiders are prohibited from trading but are not subject to the
antitipping prohibitions. This gap in the legislation may reflect the
impracticality of detecting and successfully prosecuting remote tipping of
nonpublic information. Nevertheless, the commentary is devoid of any
explanation for not subjecting secondary insiders to the antitipping
provisions. Consistency mandates extending the antitipping rules to remote
parties, at least to those who knowingly make a selective disclosure of
information that they know originated from a corporate insider and that they
know is inside information.
Under the EC Directive, determination of improper trading is based not
on a fiduciary duty, but rather on trading while in possession of the
information. This is the rule for both primary and secondary insiders. 30 In
contrast, the antitipping rule is limited to primary insiders. Once it is
established that a primary insider possesses material nonpublic information,
he or she is prohibited from disclosing the information to a third party, unless
such disclosure is in the normal course of the primary insider's employment,
31
profession, or duties.
The EC Directive attempts to strike a balance between the need to provide
a clear and predictable rule and the fear of overregulating trading that does
not present the pernicious effects of the unfair use of nonpublic information.
The different tipping rules applicable to primary and secondary insiders may
reflect an attempt to balance the need for effective insider trading
enforcement against the risk of establishing too broad a prohibition. Another
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at
at

art
art
art
art
art

1(I).
2(1).
4.
2(1), 4.
3(a).
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example of the desire to place limits on the scope of what is considered to be
improper trading is found in the exclusions from the mandated trading
prohibitions. While member states can, of course, decide to adopt more
stringent legislation, they are not required to do so. Various activities are not
addressed by the Directive. For example, the Directive does not prohibit a
tender offeror or its affiliate in a control transaction from acquiring shares
prior to announcement of a takeover attempt. 32 Other practices not covered
by the EC directive include: analyst estimates derived from publicly-available
information, 3 3 and legitimate market-making, brokerage, and stabilization
4
activities by investment firms.3
As noted above, the United States stands to learn from the EC Directive's
definition of improper trading. On the other hand, the Directive's attempt to
eliminate material nonpublic information through its mandate that issuers
disclose such information is not well designed. It is badly designed because,
as described above, it leaves a gap in its coverage of secondary insiders. The
EC Directive goes beyond insider trading by mandating issuer disclosure of
material information.3 5 The intent of the provision is to reduce the frequency
of insider trading by regulating one of the factors that contributes to the
environment that facilitates personal gain on nonpublic information. The
environmental factor is weak affirmative disclosure requirements for issuers.
The affirmative disclosure mandate is designed to eliminate the existence of
nonpublic material information. Although the New York and American Stock
Exchanges have a similar rule,3 6 in practice, it is not effective because there
may be important business reasons for keeping information confidential.
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has recognized that merger
37
negotiations cannot be conducted in a fishbowl.
It is questionable whether the EC affirmative disclosure mandate can or
will have a significant effect in reducing insider trading. Furthermore, it puts
companies in a most awkward position. Encouraging prompt disclosure is
quite different from mandating it. Strict prohibitions against insiders who
trade, coupled with an effective enforcement program, are adequate weapons
32. In contrast, SEC Rule 14e-3 expressly excludes bidder transactions from the reach of the
rule's trading prohibitions. 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (1991).
33. CCH Commentary on Control of Insider Dealing, I Common Mkt Rep (CCH)
1763,
1763.05 (Directive No 89/592).
34. Id. Other areas not covered include transaction by member states and/or their agents in
furtherance of their monetary, exchange rate, or public debt management policies; brokers with
insider information whose activities are limited to carrying out customers' instructions; stabilizing
activities in connection with pricing of primary and secondary offerings; transactions based on
estimates deprived from publicly available data; and communication of inside information to an
enforcement authority. Id.
35. EC Insider Trading Directive at art 7 (cited in note 2).
36. New York Stock Exchange Company Manual §§ 202.05, 202.06, 3 Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH)
23,519, 23,520 (1989). See also American Stock Exchange Company Guide §§ 401, 402, 2 Am
Stock Exchange Guide (CCH)
10,121-10,122 (1992).
37. Basic, Inc. v Levinson, 485 US 224 (1988). The rule in this country is that while a company
cannot make materially misleading statements, it can simply refuse to make any comment. Id; see
Thomas L. Hazen, Rumor Control and Disclosure of Merger Negotiations or Other Control-Related Transactions:
Full Disclosure or "No Comment"-The Only Safe Harbors, 46 Md L Rev 954 (1987).
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against trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. Although
some observers might quibble with the location of the EC Directive's lines, at
least the lines are clearly drawn.
IV
A

COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES LAW ON INSIDER TRADING

AND THE

EC

DIRECTIVE

The clear definitional approach taken by the Directive is preferable to the
murky rule in this country. Not only does the Directive provide certainty and
predictability, it is capable of handling the difficult question of the liability of
persons other than true insiders.
The advantages of the Directive are evident from examining how it would
be applied to the facts of some of the key cases in this country. As is the case
in the United States, true insiders are prohibited from trading on inside
information. 38 Similarly, insiders are not permitted to pass the information
on to others for their personal gain or for the purpose of improper trading by
the tippees. 39 In Chiarella, the printer would qualify as a primary insider
under the EC directive and thus would be prohibited both from trading on the
information and from passing it on to someone else. The psychiatrist who
trades on information provided by a patient would qualify as a primary insider
because he had access to the information "by virtue of the exercise of his
employment, profession, or duties."' 40 This language would not include a
family relationship and thus would track Chestman insofar as it would not find
that the customer who obtained the information from his wife was more than
a secondary insider and thus could not be liable for tipping (as opposed to
trading on) the information. On the other hand, the broker obtained the
information in the course of his employment and thus would seem to qualify
as a primary insider under the EC directive and hence would be precluded
from either trading or tipping.
A major difference between the EC Directive and the law in the United
States is that the Directive would apply to remote tippees. A remote tippee
who overhears the information, knowing it to be material and nonpublic,
would qualify as a secondary insider since the "direct or indirect source of
[the information] could not be other than a [primary insider]." 4 ' The
Directive thus focuses on the source of the information, not on whether the
source breached a duty in passing on the information. 42 Congress stands to
benefit from the EC's lesson if it is willing to adopt a definition that focuses on
38. See SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833 (2d Cir 1968).
39. See United States v Carpenter, 791 F2d 1024, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 US 19
(1987). Compare Dirks v SEC, 463 US 646 (1983) (discussing in dictum the scope of tippee liability).
40. EC Insider Trading Directive at art 2 § 1 (cited in note 2).
41. Id at art 4. Compare SEC v Switzer, 590 F Supp 756 (WD Okla 1984) (remote tippee is not
liable). See also Dirks v SEC, 463 US 646, 663 (tippee not liable without showing that the tipper
breached a duty).
42. Compare Dirks v SEC, 463 US 646, 663 (indicating that for a tippee to be liable, the tip must
be tainted with a breach of duty).
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possession and use of information rat-her than on a duty tied to a fraud-based
rule.
V
CONCLUSION

The EC has accomplished something that the U.S. Congress has not been
able to accomplish. By defining specifically the persons and transactions
covered by insider trading prohibitions, the EC Directive provides certainty in
the rule of law not found in the United States counterpart. Interestingly,
much of the theory underlying the EC Directive was adopted from the United
States case law. Congress should follow the EC approach and codify the law,
thereby providing needed certainty and coherence.

